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DOCI for NIS

CIA and CIA-Coordinated Intelligence Support
for the Overseas Internal Defense Program.

I have been asked to discuss the intelligence support which the Central Intelligence Agency furnishes to the U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Program.

I do not propose to go into minute detail on the precise machinery by which the services of the CIA are meshed into the various alphabetical levels of the program--the SIGs, and the IRGs, and the National Policy Papers, and the Interdepartmental Contingency Coordinating Committee.

For one thing, I imagine it is not very different from the relationships of the other agencies to this interdepartmental program.

Secondly, and more to the point, I feel that what the CIA can provide is probably more important to you than how we provide it.

We have one principal product: finished intelligence.

There are, of course, various publications, and our customers may have varying interests, but the basic product is the same, whether we are supplying it to the White House, or to a special program like the Internal Defense Program, or to a Congressional committee.

It has certain trademarks I would like to discuss with you first, before we take up how it is produced, and how it gets to the SIG or the IRG.

It is national intelligence.

It is "net" intelligence.

It is tactical intelligence.

It is, to an increasing degree, all-source intelligence.

These four requirements have arisen mainly over the past five or six years, as the requirements of our principal customers have changed.

To take the first term, national intelligence is defined in the National Security Council Intelligence Directives as coordinated, agreed intelligence on matters which have a direct bearing on national security interests, and which "transcend the exclusive competence" of any single government department or agency.

Our estimative intelligence and our basic intelligence--for instance, the National Intelligence Estimate and the National Intelligence Survey--have long been national. These documents reflect the combined information and the agreed views of all of the elements in the intelligence community--or they at least reflect the dissents and minority viewpoints in footnotes and exceptions.

Much of our day-to-day relationship with the policy makers of the government, however, consists of a requirement, not for the formal and deliberate process of the NIE or the NIS, but the crash, flap-happy, immediate field of current intelligence.

Late in 1957 the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board--then the Killian Committee and now the

Clifford Committee--recommended that the current intelligence which the CIA provided to the decision-makers of the Government should also be national intelligence.

Now, the NSC ID's have a definition for Current Intelligence, and the one I quoted for National Intelligence, but in their wisdom they have never provided a definition for National Current Intelligence. The whole concept is a paradox, if not a basic contradiction.

When we speak of Current Intelligence in the era of the ICBM and the thermonuclear warhead, we think in terms of 25 or 30 minutes. The Intelligence Community has 25X1D devoted a great deal of time, effort, equipment and money to the Critical Communications Net, [redacted]

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A documents like a National Intelligence Survey, on the other hand, may take as much as six months from its drafting to its final distribution before all of the participating agencies here and in the field have signed off on each judgment, each formulation, and each fact ~~exist~~ in the paper.

Take the reporting on the Vietnam situation in the Central Intelligence Bulletin each morning. This is the principal publication to which the Killian Committee addressed its recommendation for intelligence at the national level.

At the same time, the high-level readers of the Bulletin are going to expect the latest available information in the publication they pick up at the opening of business each morning. They have a right to expect something more accurate, more informed, but at the same time more up-to-date than what they may have read at breakfast in the bulldog edition of the New York Times, or even the Washington Post with a deadline shortly after midnight.

As a result, the cut-off time for information in the Vietnam piece is 4:30 a.m.---and I think it would be a little difficult, at four-thirty or five each morning, to convene a panel out in Langley with representatives of the State Department and the several armed services to pool their knowledge and reach an agreed report on the Vietnam fighting.

Similarly, the Director of Central Intelligence expects that when we learn of some major development overseas of importance to our national security, we will inform the Director, and our top customers outside the Agency, in a matter of minutes--not hours. In daylight hours, it would be possible to convene a panel, but by the time agreement was reached, the information might be national, but it would be less than current.

We are caught in a bind where there is less and less time or opportunity for coordination, and yet the decisions to be taken are so grave that it is more and more essential

for the policy-maker to feel assured that the critical information on which he bases his decision is the best which can be furnished to him by the combined resources of the entire intelligence community. The information does indeed "transcend the exclusive competence of any single department or agency."

Obviously, we have had to come up with a number of compromises and substitutes for full-fledged, formal coordination to answer the requirement for national current intelligence.

The first is the panel or working group, either standing, or ad hoc. A good example is the machinery for producing the Central Intelligence Bulletin.

Suggested drafts for the next day's CIB items are circulated each day by secure communications to the departments concerned---DIA, INR at State, and, when appropriate, the Atomic Energy Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation when their jurisdictions are involved. Then there is a meeting out here at Langley each afternoon for representatives of the agencies concerned. By this time, the representatives are armed with the comments and proposed changes of their substantive analysts and policy or operations officers. The afternoon meeting is devoted to arriving at an agreed version of each brief for the next morning's CIB.

Somehow, this must be done without waffling--no "least common denominator."

--Sometimes, an item may be held for 24 hours in an effort to reach agreement.

--More often, first the panel representatives, and then the desk analysts at the various agencies, by secure communications, become locked in an editorial and substantive wrestling match which may continue well into the evening.

--In the final analysis, however, the CIA and specifically the Director of Central Intelligence have an alerting responsibility to the President and the National Security Council which overrides the desire for agreed intelligence. If the item will not brook delay, and it becomes obvious that we are deadlocked with opposite interpretations or evaluations, then the Central Intelligence Bulletin as spokesman for the Director will carry the CIA version, but only with an opportunity afforded to dissenting agencies to express their dissent in a footnote.

--By this process, some time between 5 and 9 p.m., we have a Central Intelligence Bulletin which comprises national current intelligence--but unfortunately, another 10 to 12 hours are going to elapse before it reaches the customers.

To bridge this gap, CIA is going to take over unilaterally, and change, expand, or update the material as the flow of intelligence dictates, until 4:30 or 5:00 in the morning, when the CIB goes to press. And so that the reader may know, in the morning, what is agreed and what is unilateral,

everything that has been changed since the panel signed off the preceding evening is marked with an asterisk.

That is one form of coordination for reaching agreement on current intelligence. We ask the other agencies to agree with the substance--the judgments, evaluations, and analysis---not necessarily with the precise wording or punctuation. In the case of the Central Intelligence Bulletin, for instance, we refer to it as being prepared by CIA "in consultation with" the other agencies. In some cases, similar panels produce Joint Memoranda.

I have gone into this in some detail because ~~it~~ the CIB.

affords a good model of the goal we now aim for in a great deal of our finished intelligence product: an agreed judgment, an agreed evaluation, if not an agreed text.

In effect, our finished intelligence circulated in the intelligence community should carry the assurance that the reader is not going to receive a diametrically opposed interpretation of the same information from another element of the intelligence community.

This leads to another level of coordination which, perhaps one step lower than "consultation," might be called "concurrence" by our people, and at least "non-dissent" by our partners in the intelligence community. I mentioned the Joint Memorandum, for example a monthly report on the presence or absence of strategic offensive weapons in Cuba, a combined undertaking of DIA and CIA. This emerges from a working group, and takes at least 24--more probably 48 or 72 hours.

In between the immediacy of the spot news analysis, and the Joint Memorandum which can take three or four days, there is bound to be a middle ground--the kind of memorandum on a current intelligence matter which can stand an overnight or a working day of delay.

We now have enough secure communications---and for that matter, even at rush hours we are all close enough together by courier--so that we can move copies of substantial texts around the community in draft expeditiously.

We now even have the LDX or Long Distance Xerography, a securely scrambled facsimile transmitter which can transmit an entire printed page in a matter of seconds on a net which links the White House, State Department Building, the Pentagon, and our Headquarters Building here.

This makes it a relatively simple matter for the country desk analyst here at CIA to pass copies of a draft memorandum to his opposite numbers in State and Defense, and ask them to let him know, as soon as they have studied it, whether there is any major disagreement--In other words, to obtain their concurrence. The memo, as it comes out, may not be exactly what they would have produced jointly, but again, it can go forward with that tacit assurance that there is agreement across the board with the general thrust of his memorandum.

It is with some diffidence that I mention our last resort in seeking to give our current intelligence a degree of concurrence. Some of my colleagues have referred to it as "telepathic coordination."

The field of current intelligence repeatedly confronts us with developments which break in the middle of the night and must be dealt with before the opening of business the next morning. These items will be detected by a watch officer who telephones the current intelligence analyst and has him come in to the office to write a memorandum, or possibly an analysis for the Central Intelligence Bulletin.

At this point, the analyst is the loneliest man in the world. There is neither the time nor the opportunity for him to consult with his economic or scientific specialists, his division or area chiefs, or his opposite numbers at State and Defense. He may have only a few minutes to dig into his files. This is one reason why our professionals in the Office of Current Intelligence have to be professionals in every sense of the word--- a recent survey showed that some 43 percent have graduate degrees, and more than 30 percent of them have spent 15 years or more in intelligence.

We have enjoined the analyst, however, to make every effort possible, when he is engaged in such a one-man show, to convene what you might call an imaginary working group. Professionalism involves not only background, area knowledge, and research---it also means a sustained

interchange of opinion, interpretation, and knowledge with other experts in the field. We have the communications, the relationships, the working groups today so that there is every opportunity for the analyst in one agency to keep himself fully informed on the opinions and evaluations of his opposite numbers in other government departments. We expect that when he is forced to work alone, he will take the other viewpoints into account.

True, he will be protected in the Central Intelligence Bulletin by an asterisk which indicates that the item does not claim to speak for the Department of State or the Department of Defense. But with the injunction which has been placed upon us to produce national current intelligence, we do not want to be forced to carry another item in the Bulletin the next day which says, translated from the diplomatic governmentalese: "The Departments of State and Defense think that the item in this morning's Bulletin was hogwash."

Finally, as you may have seen in some of our recent publications and memoranda, we are now establishing a system of footnotes which not only set forth the extent of coordination which has taken place, but also specifically warn the reader of the absence of coordination where there has been none.

What I have said about the effort to achieve agreed national intelligence, of course, applies in general to

all of our finished intelligence, but I feel that it is of particular importance in our support of the Overseas Internal Defense Program and other similar undertakings, because the importance of the resultant decisions, plans, or actions based on that information make it essential that you have the assurance that the intelligence given you is the best effort of the intelligence community.

As another of my four key characteristics of our product, I mentioned "net" intelligence.

This is a term we have borrowed from the estimators for a fairly recent development in current intelligence. When we make a projection, for instance, of how many operational ICBMs the Soviet Union may have in mid-1968, that is an estimate. When, at the request of the policy makers, we compare this in the same piece of paper with the number of launchers which will be operational in the United States at the same time, it is called a "net" estimate. Carrying this general idea over to the broad field of finished intelligence, the term "net" implies that we are reporting, not only on foreign developments and the actions of foreign governments, but also on the related policies, actions, and capabilities of the United States.

There used to be a time, not too many years ago, when we followed a rule that intelligence reporting

would not "G-2" our own government. Our reports, in other words, did not reflect how the United States government was reacting or could react to a given situation. It certainly did not go into the field of how the United States government should react. It did not indicate what measures the intelligence community was taking.

There were a number of reasons for this rule. To some degree, acting otherwise would have involved operational information. It might have put us in the middle of an argument over alternative courses of action. But the basic reason for the rule was probably the belief that if our reporting never touched on the actions or reactions of the United States, the intelligence community and specifically the Central Intelligence Agency could never be accused of trying to make policy.

A look at the record suggests that the old rule may have been our own Noble Experiment--a good ideal, but not very effective.

In any event, relationships between the intelligence community and the executive decision-makers tend to boil down in the final analysis to personal relationships --the relationship between a President and a Director of Central Intelligence, to be precise--and as these individuals change, so do our rules and methods of operation.

If you want a specific date for the change, I would suggest October, 1962, and the Cuban missile crisis.

The President and his chosen instrument for handling that crisis--the group which became known as the Executive Committee of the NSC--were not satisfied with finished intelligence which confined itself to coverage of the Soviets and the Cubans. A report on the position or the cargo of a Soviet merchantship was useful, but it amounted to reporting in a vacuum. The policy makers wanted to know what aircraft were doing to maintain surveillance, what ships we had in a position to intercept the Soviet ship if desired. And they wanted this information--this net intelligence, if you please--on one piece of paper or in one briefing.

I must admit that when the Cuban missile crisis began, we were not only omitting this information from our finished intelligence, but we did not have ready access to it. We did not, by the old rules, have a need to know. As you can imagine, this changed--fast.

Today, at least for the top policy-makers from whom no secrets are hidden, our reporting not only gives the full intelligence picture--the war room situation report, in effect--but also includes in many cases the countermeasures being planned or undertaken by the United States.

This brings me from net intelligence to the third of my characteristics--tactical intelligence.

The men who make policy levied the requirement for net intelligence. The men who implement policy--the operators--levied a requirement for tactical intelligence.

Both of these requirements created a need for new machinery, and when we created it, we found that the machinery served both purposes.

In short, we set up a focal point in CIA to exchange new types of information with the rest of the U.S. Government--to carry the broadened need to know beyond the confines of the intelligence community to the operators. And when we finished, we found we had a communications link that flowed both ways. We got operational information from State, and from Defense--and along with the information on the United States posture we got requirements for more information on the posture of foreign governments. We passed these to the intelligence community, and we got back from the field specific tactical information of use to the operators.

Out of this new and wider cooperation, for instance, came specific information on the attempts of Cuba and foreign middlemen to obtain and ship petroleum additives vital to Cuban industry--the so-called "bright stock." And as a result, State and CIA operational personnel in the field were given the tactical information they needed to deprive Cuba of substantial imports of bright stock.

During the fighting and negotiating in the Dominican Republic, we were able to gear our reporting specifically to what our diplomatic and military representatives there

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needed to know about the plans, the strengths, and the covert activities of the rebel forces and in particular the three Communist parties.

The ad hoc machinery of the Cuban missile crisis, and the Soviet troop withdrawal the following spring, has become an Operations Center in CIA which not only operates our 24-hour Watch Office, but maintains current information of the war-room type on the U. S. side of the picture. To do this, the Operations Center in CIA has multiple, secure communications links with the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, the Operations Center at the Department of State, and the White House situation room. Our Operations Center, in fact, has its own personnel in the NMCC on a round-the-clock basis, and has standby arrangements for similar staffing in the State Operations Center in times of crisis.

Along with the Operations Center--in fact, it was the organizational parent of the Ops Center--we have a Collection Guidance Staff, which operates closely with both the Operations Center and the rest of the intelligence community to deploy and direct the collectors of information on the basis of current tactical requirements.

Today, when we have a crisis of major proportions, we move a task force of country specialists into the Operations Center to work on a 24-hour staffing basis,

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representing both the analytical and the operational assets of CIA, and geared, if required, to produce situation reports every hour, on the hour, around the clock, as we did at the peak of the Dominican crisis. These reports are both net for the policy maker, and tactical for the operators.

As for my fourth and last characteristic, the all-source nature of our finished intelligence, this is not particularly new. I want only to mention that under our concept of all-source reporting, our publications and memoranda at the various levels of security classification not only range up to the highest levels permitted by the clearances of those particular recipients, but downward to include all pertinent information from whatever source is available, be it press reports, basic intelligence, or encyclopedias and other open reference works.

All of these factors then, are designed to make the finished intelligence product as useful as possible, not only to the makers of policy, and the planners, but to the operators--to the man in the field who ultimately implements the policies and the plans.

I have probably stressed the current intelligence aspect of our reporting, possibly because that is my bailiwick, more probably because in times of crisis this is the field in which we have the most direct impact in our interdepartmental relationships.

But we also produce the basic intelligence for the operator--not only the generalized National Intelligence Surveys which I have already mentioned, but handbooks specifically tailored to the needs of U.S. personnel operating in the field, whether in military assistance, counter-subversion, AID, or covert operations. And in our estimates, in our indications intelligence, and in current reporting, the Central Intelligence Agency must constantly bear in mind the future and the speculative look forward---the vital alerting or warning role of intelligence.

This brings me directly to our relationship with the U. S. Overseas Interdial Defense Program, ---the contingency papers, the policy papers, and the whole effort you have been discussing in this seminar.

The Office of Current Intelligence produces, periodically, a memorandum entitled "Instability in Latin America." It is a sort of "Morning line," as the race track touts would call it, spotting and rating the factors for stability and instability in each country of Latin America.

The first time this memorandum was drafted, in response to a White House request, it not only ensured

itself of periodic revision, but generated the request through the Interdepartmental Contingency Coordinating Committee for contingency papers 25X1C

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I have been asked to be specific about "intelligence support to the planning and conduct of the U.S. OIDP... including the SIG, IRGs, the NPPs, and to ICCC contingency planning." I have managed to decode all of these, and this is probably the time to be responsive.

I have been discussing all this time, I hope, the general question of intelligence support, so that what remains is the particular relationship of CIA to these various bodies and papers.

The Central Intelligence Agency is represented at National Security Council meetings, at the top of the whole structure, by the Director of Central Intelligence. He is an adviser to the NSC, not as the head of CIA, but as the principal intelligence officer of the President, and chairman of the entire Intelligence Community. He goes to these meetings, naturally, armed with the best current, basic, and estimative intelligence available to the government. When there is a policy paper on the agenda, that policy paper has been checked out against that same body of intelligence within CIA, in case the Director is asked for the comments of the intelligence community on the proposed policy or course of action.

In the Senior Interdepartmental Group, CIA is also represented by the Director, or sometimes by his Deputy.

I should mention one specific CIA input to the meetings of the SIG. We formerly had a weekly publication, prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence for the Special Group dealing with the counter-insurgency efforts of the U. S. Government. This publication is still issued on a weekly basis, but it has now been tailored to the needs, interests and requirements of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, covering a somewhat broader range of events and situations which could require policy decisions by the U. S. government, rather than the precise field of subversion and insurgency.

At the IRG level, the CIA representative is the divisional chief--from our operational side of the house--for the geographic area concerned.

When we come to the working groups for the National Policy Papers or the ICCC contingency papers, however, the CIA representative as a rule comes from the intelligence side of the house.

In either case, our representative at the IRG or in the working groups speaks, of course, for the CIA as a whole, and comes backed up by a coordination effort which has tapped all of the pertinent elements of the Agency for their views and contributions. The choice of an operator/collector on the one hand, or an analyst/producer on the other, reflects primarily the

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most rational or logical assignment of responsibility within our own house.

The IRGs, in effect, are planning and operating, and we send them our operators. The drafting, evaluation, and coordination of the intelligence aspect for policy papers and contingency papers, on the other hand, falls more in the province of our intelligence producers.

In this latter category, the input, as I have said, is drawn from the CIA as a whole, but the legwork is generally provided by the Office of Current Intelligence. I understand that the National Policy Paper on Brazil, for instance, has now been in the works since January, 1964. To me, this signifies a high and continuing need for a current intelligence input to keep the project up to date.

So much for our participation, but the guts of my subject is our support for these efforts and this, no matter how many papers we may help to draft, vet, and edit, comes back to intelligence support.

Today we face a great continuing threat to the interests and the national security of the United States which is a constant in its essentials, whether you call it Cold War, insurgency, subversion, or Wars of National Liberation. To meld Clausewitz, Marx, and Kissinger, it is the continuation of Communist aggression by means other than general global thermonuclear war. It is the Communist attempt at an end run around the strategic thermonuclear balance.

The Communists, all over the world, are looking for vulnerabilities, for the social and economic soft spots that they can develop from discontent to disaffection, to subversion, and finally to insurgency and revolt. It has cost us enough to counter the Communist effort in its bloody final forms, so that we must seek it out and take preventive measures in the earlier stages. Intelligence must give early warning whenever possible, identify the soft spots and vulnerabilities before the Communists begin to develop the dissidence and the insurgency. In the long run, it is going to be easier to repair the social fabric and eliminate the soft spots, than to suppress a full-blown war.

Long before the so-called Movement of the Revolutionary Left in Peru launched its abortive guerrilla war, intelligence had identified the principal Communist conspirators, penetrated their organizations, even sent agents through the full routine of guerrilla warfare training. On paper, the Peruvian guerrillas were stronger, had better terrain, and more external support, than Castro had when he went into the Sierra Maestra nearly ten years ago. But in Peru, there was adequate intelligence, which permitted adequate preparation of countermeasures, and the guerrilla campaign was smashed.

In Colombia, civic action programs for the first time are achieving the elimination of bandit and Communist enclaves which have withstood military operations for a decade. But the civic action programs

intelligence which identifies the problems, before remedies can be applied.

Even in Vietnam, where we have a full-blown war, improved intelligence is playing a significant role in the success of spoiling operations and in the pacification effort.

Vietnam, however, is hardly a good example of timely warning for preventive action. It is obviously easier to counter subversion and to suppress insurgency at the Thailand level than in its Vietnam stages.

This early warning, identification of dissidents, and pinpointing of vulnerabilities is the type of intelligence support you have a right to expect. And to the best of our ability, it is the kind of intelligence support we intend to give you.